


**OCCASIONAL PAPERS/
REPRINTS SERIES
IN CONTEMPORARY
ASIAN STUDIES**

NUMBER 6 — 1981 (43)

**CHINESE REGIONALISM:
YESTERDAY AND TODAY**

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University
of
Maryland**



***Occasional Papers/Reprint Series
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All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to

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500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA.

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Price for single copy of this issue: US \$2.00

CHINESE REGIONALISM: YESTERDAY AND TODAY

BY FRANZ MICHAEL

In a country the size of China, the problem of central control over the vast territory and the multitude of Chinese people is obviously of inherent complexity. whatever the system of government, China had to be divided and was divided into regional and local administrations to govern the country. In essence these were the provinces and districts which have remained largely unchanged over the centuries. Throughout Chinese history, central control over these regional subdivisions posed, however, recurring problems. Instead of serving simply as branches of the central government, these regional administrations could also use their local resources to defy central authority and to aspire to autonomy or even to challenge the central government's rule altogether. In that case "regionalism" connotes a counterpole to the centralized political and social order that has characterized Chinese state and society. A "region" in this tradition may then be defined as a distinct area of political, military, social and economic identity, somewhat related, but not necessarily synonymous with the provincial units or clusters of them into which China was divided in imperial, nationalist, and communist times.

In essence the word "regionalism" as applied to China is to be understood as structural and institutional; it does not and should not assume the coloration of ethnic, racial, or dialectic-linguistic overtones that accompanies the concept in some European and other Western cases and is sometimes connected with the term "provincialism." To some extent these latter characteristics may be found in some regions or subregional divisions of China, especially in areas of minority populations; but in general they are not the dominant factor in the discussion of the problem of regionalism in China: past and present.

Though the question of regionalism in China has remained an important problem as of today, its character has obviously undergone major changes together with the change of ideology and institutions that have taken place between the imperial, the nationalist, and the communist systems. During each phase of Chinese history, the relationship between central power and regional authority depended on the political, social, economic, and ideological order of the time. To assess the present relationship, it will therefore be useful to compare and contrast it with the past. For this reason we preface the examination of the communist system with a short characterization of the imperial and nationalist situations.

A. *Historical Prologue: Imperial China*

In imperial times, each dynasty was faced with the potential danger from regional military forces which could and did establish regional power bases, limiting and weakening central authority and eventually posing a threat to the dynasty's survival. The chief reason for this recurring problem was the limited function of the imperial state. Within the state the emperor was all powerful, but the state itself was far more limited than any modern state, let alone a communist totalitarian state, and the society was then far more autonomous than its modern counterparts.

The reason for this traditional relationship and for the concomitant problems of central control can be found in the basic institutional structure of the Chinese imperial state and society as determined by its ideology and of the consequences in the realm of military power, both contrasting fundamentally with the communist system.

The ruling stratum in imperial state and society, in Max Weber's sense, was the Chinese gentry, a bureaucracy united by common beliefs and values and a common system of education.¹ In contrast to the party elite of modern times, the members of the gentry had their own ideological source of authority, independent of the state. Their Confucian concepts limited by definition the authority of the state and provided them with the social responsibility to manage society according to their Confucian concepts. As a result, the gentry, who held a monopoly on the official positions of the state, served in their large majority in positions of social leadership as teachers, managers of community organizations, arbiters of judicial disputes, and directors of public works, and in many other social and scholarly functions. In their dual role as officials and social leaders, the members of the gentry formed the link between a state whose functions were limited and the substantially autonomous social order. As state officials, the members of the gentry served a centralized system, but as social leaders they were regionally located and active on their own. Their social leadership did not depend on any imperial command. It was autonomous; indeed, they believed that they carried the burden of the world on their shoulders.

A collapse of the dynasty did not affect the social order and the role of the gentry with whose help the dynastic structure was ever again rebuilt. In fact, it was the autonomy of the gentry and the link

1. For a study of the Chinese gentry, see Chung-li Chang, *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth Century Chinese Society*, "Introduction," by Franz Michael; Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955.

with regional officials which the dynasties tried to curb to prevent the very regional threat that could lead to their downfall. All the policies to keep the officials in the emperors' "basket" were designed to serve this purpose. To prevent the provincial officials from combining all regional power in any one hand and to cooperate too intimately with the regional gentry, the imperial government followed the principle of divide and rule. Aside from provincial governors — and the few governors general who ruled over two or three provinces — the imperial government appointed provincial commissioners on revenue, justice, education and provincial military commanders, all of whom dealt directly with the respective boards in Peking and in some cases reported on each other in a system of check and balance. A policy of limited tenure and of avoiding appointments in any candidates home area was designed to keep the officials from linking up with the provincial gentry. These measures still form an interesting backdrop to today's communist policy of maintaining a check on provincial authorities. Their failure led in imperial times to the decline of the dynasties.

The danger of undermining imperial authority by regional defiance occurred, however, in its final stage through a breakdown of military control. It was the combination of political with military power on a regional level that spelled disaster for dynastic government. In times of disintegration, weakening dynastic power, banditry and oppressive corruption leading to rebellions, local forces and regional armies were formed under gentry and non-gentry leadership as a matter of self-defense or in competition with regional rivals. These armies were loyal to their commanders, regardless of whether the latter were rebels or loyalists. As provincial armies, especially the models of Ming or Ching time, or as rebel forces that emerged from regional organizations, they weakened central authority, thereby inviting foreign aggression or leading to the dynasty's overthrow from within. It had therefore been imperial policy to retain control of all military forces, a policy that frequently broke down at the time of dynastic weakening and decline. The military disintegration reached its culmination during the period of warlordism;² but the problem of

2. The term "warlordism" describes the situation in modern Chinese history when political power was in the hands of regional military leaders who fought among themselves for control of territory and tax income which they largely regarded as their personal spoils. The period of warlordism per se lasted from 1916 to 1927, but warlord rule in many provinces continued into the early years of the national government. See Franz H. Michael and George E. Taylor, *The Far East in the Modern World*, (3d ed., Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1975), pp. 371-374.

military power centers remained an issue also under the communist regime.

Confucian Ideology. In listing these traditional elements of regionalism, the problem of provincial structure and military command in a limited imperial state, the question of the motive force and goals of regional development has so far been mentioned only in passing. Yet in the assessment of the importance of the regional potential, past and present, this question may be most crucial. In imperial times regionalism could have two purposes. If it led to erosion of dynastic authority and strengthening of regional gentry powers as in the 19th century under Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang,³ it aimed simply at a shift in power within the existing dynasty without attempting — at least for the time being — to unseat the government itself. If it aimed at the overthrow of the dynasty and the establishment of a new dynastic regime, it was a challenge to a specific dynastic control. In neither case did it aim at destroying the Confucian order of state and society or, more important still, at splitting the Middle Kingdom into new separate independent states. The struggle was for power within an accepted order. Only in the mid-nineteenth century, under the impact of the West did this order itself come under attack by the Tai-ping Rebellion,⁴ the beginning of a new phase in Chinese history. Up to that time and even though in practice imperial China experienced periods of prolonged dismemberment, the concept of unity within the Confucian order prevailed. Even during the north-south division from the third to the sixth century A.D.,⁵ the ideal of unity under

3. Tseng Kuo-fan (1811–1872) and Li Hung-chang (1823–1901) were high officials under the Ch'ing Dynasty who formed their own provincial armies to defend the Dynasty against the Taiping Rebellion and became governors-general of the central and lower Yangtse region respectively, establishing their own regional organizations. See *ibid.*, pp. 186–94.

4. The Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), a massive uprising against the Ch'ing Dynasty, was in part caused by economic and political deterioration typical for the declining period of each dynasty. But it derived its unique character from its organization under fanatical religious leadership which believed in a mission of establishing a form of radical Christianity, the "heavenly kingdom," on earth, replacing the Confucian order. See Franz Michael, *The Taiping Rebellion*, Vol. I, *History*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966.

5. During the period of the 3d to 6th centuries A.D., China was divided between the northern part of the country, ruled by a number of dynasties established by outside invaders, and the South, ruled by dynasties formed by indigenous houses. In both regions Buddhism made large inroads in religion, art, social life, and politics, but Confucianism, enriched by Buddhism, prevailed and remained the dominant cultural and political force.

Confucian dynastic rule was not abandoned. The reason was that even under the impact of Buddhism, and certainly at all other times, the Confucian roof remained over the impaired edifice of Chinese state and society and, under it, the building was eventually repaired.

B. *Nationalist China: The Unfinished Solution*

At the turn of the twentieth century, the role of the gentry ended. Without the validity of Confucianism, regionalism degenerated into warlordism. But under the national government a system of modern laws and a modern trained officialdom were meant to serve a state whose functions in law, education, and other social activities were intended to cover a much wider area than that of the imperial past. In the economy, the development of private enterprise was to be protected by modern Western law. The modernization of China appeared to be well on the way, but major problems remained. They were chiefly military and forced the national government to adopt a policy of military priority. Of the three chief obstacles to unification and establishment of a true nation-state, only one was regional in character: the problem of warlordism, which not only stood in the way of political central control, but also kept most of the local tax, in particular the land tax, out of government hands, thereby weakening national financial strength and forcing heavy reliance on the modern sector of the economy. The other two obstacles, communist opposition and Japanese aggression, were of national dimensions. The communists, practically defeated in 1937,⁶ were revived, thanks to Japanese aggression, and though Japan was finally defeated in World War II, the economic and spiritual exhaustion led to the collapse and defeat of the national government of the mainland and the success of the communist armies. It was the combination of these three forms of military opposition which overwhelmed the nationalist effort.

In retrospect, the elements for central unity were present in the nationalist phase. The nationalist army itself was organized as a central force though regional armies continued to create problems

6. In 1934 the communists were forced out of their base in southern Kiangsi Province and neighboring provinces by the nationalist blockade strategy and went on the "long march," a costly retreat to Shensi Province into a much less favorable position. See Michael/Taylor, op. cit., pp. 415-18 and Franz Michael, *Mao and the Perpetual Revolution*, Woodbury New York: Barrons Educational Series, 1977, pp. 43-47.

(Sian incident, etc.).⁷ Most of all, nationalism had become the new unifying ideology. The first of Sun Yat-sen's three principles, it gave the name to the party and the government and by its very concept was a centralizing force. As a concept, nationalism stresses the common interests of a people, connected by ties of blood, generally manifested by a community of language, and bound by common beliefs, customs, and a common cultural tradition and history. It is in principle the antitheses of class struggle, domestic or international, and of international revolution, and, on a lesser scale, of any form of division or of separatism within the nation.

C. *The Communist System*

As an ideology Marxism-Leninism is a totally centralized system. The communist party, claiming to be the "vanguard of the proletariat," dominates society as well as the state. Since the party asserts its total control over the state and society, there is no clear demarcation between the two. In both society and state, the party members are the new elite, those who are functionaries of the state. In the party the so-called "democratic centralism" is central rather than democratic and stresses the authority of the central leadership, whether theoretically "collective" or, practically, always tending towards one-man rule. Any power struggle is therefore normally a factional battle within the party. Since the party claims to possess the ideological truth, such power struggle even if over specific policies has always to be argued also in ideological terms, the loser being a right-wing or left-wing deviationist from the correct line.

It is in this framework that the communist system of regional structures and control has to be understood. It is a system in which security comes before efficiency, and the party line determines all social and economic as well as political decisions. If in imperial times there was a division of authority on the provincial level, the communists developed this division much further, making use of their conceptual framework. As at the center, a party and an administrative structure were established in the provinces, each responsive to its respective central authority. To avoid concentration

7. In December 1936 Chiang Kai-shek flew to Sian to inveigh insubordinate provincial troops from Manchuria to continue their campaign against the communist armies. In turn Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by the troops and their commanders and released only after he had agreed to abandon the campaign and lead a united front resistance against the anticipated Japanese attack against China. See Michael/Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 419-21; Michael, *Mao and the Perpetual Revolution*, pp. 50-55.

of provincial authority in one hand, separate functionaries were appointed as a rule as provincial party secretaries and governors, respectively. However, in order to strengthen interdependence and control, a system of intermeshing appointments was introduced under which generally the first party secretary was concurrently deputy governor of the province while the governor was concurrently second or third provincial party secretary. Such interlocking appointments were obviously meant to guarantee cooperation while at the same time leaving the party in control. Second, third, and lower party secretaries and deputy governors were linked through combined appointments in the same manner. Party control at the center and party control at the provincial level were thus to insure the full party dominance and prevent any provincial autonomy, resistance, or defiance of the center — as long as “democratic centralism” remained unchallenged. If and when this system of separate appointments was discontinued and one person occupied the leading provincial party and administrative posts, especially if combined with military command or commissar position, the danger of provincial defiance of central control or what the communists called “individual kingdoms” or “mountaintop” insubordination would and did reappear. It was for the very purpose of avoiding this danger that, after the first phase of military occupation in 1949⁸ (when the country was divided into military regions), and after the lesson of the purge of the Manchurian party head and administrator Kao Kang,⁹ the communists, in setting up a civil structure, established this intricate system of division and intermeshing of provincial authority.

Economic Control. Through the five-year plan of 1953 another line of central control over the provinces was introduced in the economic field. The five-year plan was centrally conceived and directed, and the allocation of material, labor, and, most of all, funds to the industrial plants was handled mainly by the vertically organized central industrial ministries which also determined price,

8. After the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, China was at first divided into six military administrative regions by the Organic Law of the Great Administrative Area Governments of December 16, 1949. Whatever civilian administration was set up, was placed under army control.

9. Kao Kang had been a local communist leader in Yen-an before Mao's arrival there at the end of the long march. Though he did not belong to Mao's leadership group, Kao Kang had supported Mao in previous power struggles and had been appointed top administrator in industrialized Manchuria after the establishment of the People's Republic. In 1954 he was accused of having attempted to build an “independent kingdom,” was purged and said to have committed suicide.

wages, and the like. Though the revenue procurement was in part handled by the provincial authorities, who collected 60 percent of government revenues while 40 percent were directly received by the central government from major enterprises under central management, the central authorities controlled all use of funds through its planning.

The central allocation of resources permitted the planners to carry out a policy of equalizing regional disparity by transferring income and wealth from the more developed to the more backward regions. This policy of leveling economic growth was clearly designed to mitigate for strategic as well as political reasons the existing imbalance between the most developed regions of the country, the large cities on the East coast and in Manchuria, and the provinces and regions of the hinterland, that were lagging behind in their development. It was the part's decision that dictated this policy which was, economically, undoubtedly a drag on the progress of the most advanced regions and therefore disadvantageous to them and to the full promotion of China's economic potential.

This centralized system of the first five-year plan was somewhat modified in the later 1950s when, beginning with the second five-year plan, the provincial authorities were asked to share in the economic planning in order to avoid at least some of the inordinate waste and duplication caused by overcentralized planning. The principle was that the various economic plans drawn up by the provinces were to be integrated into the central economic plan.

Some observers assumed that through this policy of delegating part of the planning to the provincial authorities, provincial autonomy was strengthened at least in this crucial economic area.¹⁰ If so, the provinces would, however, have been able to control a larger part of their own resources for their own regional development and prevent the transfer of a greater share of their surplus to the center for allocation to other regions.¹¹ In practice, as is clear now, this assumed decentralization was never meant to permit any real authority of the provinces over the allocation of their own resources. The system of taking from the wealthier regions to give to the poorer

10. See Audrey Connithorne, *The Budget and the Plan in China: Central-Local Economic Relations*, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1972.

11. See Nicholas Lardy, "Economic Planning in the PROC: Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, D.C., 1975.

ones was, as the data show, continued.¹² The classical example is Shanghai, which until today contributed one sixth of the national revenue and surrendered 90 percent of its income to the central government for use elsewhere.¹³

To avoid any misunderstanding it must also be stressed again that these measures of decentralization were at the most a delegation of command within the party, not any granted autonomy of local development outside the party's framework. To prevent provincial autonomy, the party, as has been pointed out, worked not only through the central government, but also through the provincial and district party structure. In addition, the party had its committees and secretaries in the industrial plants, so that party supervision came indeed down to the grass roots level not only in agriculture and community life in villages and cities, but also in the modern industrial sector of the economy. Thus, the only possibility of autonomy would have occurred if there had been an easing of cohesion or of centralization within the party itself. This was not the case before the cultural revolution and, as shall be seen, is not intended today, though a doctrinal crisis may have raised a basic issue which the Chinese communist party never had to face before.

D. *The PLA*

The key to political control in the Chinese communist system was, however, the People's Liberation Army. In both imperial and nationalist times military power had been a decisive factor in establishing governments and guaranteeing their power. Under both systems, however, an enduring government had to shift from military power to civilian administration. In imperial times many short-lived dynasties were but the usurpation of power by an ambitious general; only the revival of the examination system and the reestablishment of civilian administration guaranteed any dynastic longevity. In the nationalist period, short as it was, its system of law and civil administration had taken hold before World War II.

The communist system provided a special role for the military. This role was the consequence of Lenin's strategy for communist seizure of power in the non-industrial world of Asia, in what is called today in Chinese communist terminology the "Third World" of developing countries. Lenin's Strategy Number *Two*, as it may be

12. *Ibid.*

13. Information provided to author by U.S. government specialist.

called, was designed to take the place of the so-called "proletarian revolution," which was, in its original form of urban worker uprisings, the general strike and street fighting, inapplicable in countries where there was little or no "proletariat"; instead it was used to exploit the emerging nationalism of the colonial world for communist purposes. "National liberation movements" — Lenin's term — were to use nationalism by means of a communist United Front with nationalist movements, which were to be taken over from within for a direct transition from "Feudalist bureaucracy" without full development of a "bourgeois" phase to socialism and communism.¹⁴ Such "national liberation movements" were in practice to be organized as "Wars of National Liberation," a method still part of the communist armory in 1981.

In China, which became the chief testing ground of Lenin's new strategy, this meant rural-based military organization, so often misinterpreted as "peasant war" or "peasant uprising." The term for this form of political-military organization was "revolutionary army," a term coined and applied by Lenin and Stalin, and transformed by Mao Tse-tung from Stalin's quote of 1926¹⁵ into the effective political slogan, "Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun." Such a "revolutionary army" was in itself the political force that made the revolution rather than the professional tool of a civilian communist party, as the Red Army had been in the Bolshevik Revolution. Indeed, in China, and later in similar "wars of national liberation," party and army were one, a party-army that combined in the civil war period, for all practical purposes, military command with whatever administration was established in communist controlled areas. As a result, all older Chinese communist leaders, with very few exceptions, were either military commanders or military commissars, or both.

It was this tradition that resulted in the special role of the PLA in Chinese communism, not only during the civil war, but also after the establishment of the People's Republic, and the political role of the PLA commanders added a new dimension to the problem of regionalism. In fact, in the first three years of the communist regime, when China was divided into five military regions, government was in practice a military occupation, under whose tutelage an administrative infrastructure was to be created. Even after this new

14. See the Soviet textbook, *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963, pp. 394ff.

15. See Michael, *Mao and the Perpetual Revolution*, *op. cit.* note 6, pp. 12–13.

infrastructure had taken the place of the initial military administration, a military administrative system remained superimposed on the provincial party and government institutions referred to earlier. The country was divided into eleven military regions directly responsible to Peking and under them in to 29 military districts, one for each province, municipality, or special area. These were the regional military units that caused problems for central authority. Even before and especially during the Cultural Revolution, some of the military region commanders or commissars combined their positions with those of the provincial party secretaries and chairmen of the provincial revolutionary committees. Hsu Shih-yu in Nanking and Chen Hsi-lien in Mukden who had been commanders in their regions for 15 and 20 years respectively and had combined such military with political power, are cases in point.

During the Cultural Revolution the PLA had been Mao's main tool of power. When he destroyed the party and provincial government structures which he could no longer control, Mao had to rely on the PLA under Lin Piao¹⁶ to provide the real force behind the Maoist Red Guards. The PLA, however, was not a monolith. The traditional organizational division into four or five field armies,¹⁷ which dated from the civil war and under which military careers and promotions had largely taken place within each field army, now came into play. While the First Field Army suffered purges, and the Second and Third more or less retained their strength, Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army gained hegemony in the military and political arena, tempting its leader to try to become Mao's successor. This division among the field armies was further complicated by the distinction between the central army corps and centralized units like the navy and air force on the one hand and the garrison forces stationed in the provinces on the other. It was at that time that near military clashes were narrowly avoided when some PLA provincial garrisons sided with the local party and government officials against the Red Guard attacks. Only the superior strength of the central army corps and units under Lin Piao prevented successful regional defiance of Mao's revolutionary scheme.

16. Lin Piao, during the civil war commander of the Fourth Field Army in Manchuria, was after 1959 Minister of Defense, and, under Mao, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. He was Mao's most loyal supporter among the military commanders. See Michael, *Mao and the Perpetual Revolution*, *op. cit.* note 6, pp. 43-45.

17. See William W. Whitson, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-1971*, New York: Praeger, 1973.

The purge of Lin Piao and of Fourth Field Army commanders that continued into the post-Mao period raised questions about the political role of the PLA, questions that have remained as yet unanswered. Teng Hsiao-ping, formerly political commissar of the Second Field Army, is believed to have considerable support from that faction of the PLA; but the de-emphasis of military modernization and of the political role of the PLA in the program of economic and social rehabilitation that the new leadership is trying to initiate may not be a welcome change for the older generation of PLA leaders.

Before Mao's death, a policy of musical chairs was carried out in 1973 — then the period of the first rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping — in which eight of the eleven commanders of the military regions were rotated in their posts with the obvious aim of weakening their regional attachment. Among the most important changes were the transfer of Hsu Shih-yu from Nanking to Canton in exchange for the Canton commander and the transfer of Ch'en Hsi-lien from a powerful regional post in Mukden to the more restraining political center of Peking, a position from which he was finally removed in 1981. After Teng's second rehabilitation and his assumption of the leading position of power, another such transfer of regional commanders in January 1980 was obviously designed to further weaken any regional autonomy of the military leadership.

Yet the role of the PLA is indisputably still important. On March 17, 1981, the army's official newspaper, the *Liberation Daily*, came out with an editorial that attacked all those who turned against Mao Tse-tung. The editorial focused on the as yet unreleased film by the film writer Pai Hua entitled "Bitter Love," in which the author allegedly cast doubts on the policies of the party and, in particular, the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Alluding to the film, the *Liberation Daily* stated:

Some literary and art works openly disobey the four basic principles, paint a dark picture of our party and nation, distort and smear patriotism, express grievances against the socialist system and the people's democratic dictatorship, and venomously mock and totally negate Comrade Mao Tse-tung.¹⁸

In opposing such criticism of the party and of Mao, the editorial held that:

. . . to discard the banner of Mao Tse-tung thought and even criticize Chairman Mao's correct thinking and speeches . . . will

18. *Liberation Daily*, March 17, 1981.

lead China on a dangerous road. It will make us suffer and end in disaster.¹⁹

Equally critical of the new economic policy, the paper stated that:

It has been thought that when the people have more money in their hands and when consumer goods such as television sets, radios, and tape recorders, washing machines, cameras, and refrigerators are popularized, our country will become a modern and powerful socialist state. This kind of understanding is very lopsided.²⁰

Instead of thinking "bonuses, overtime pay, and more money," the Chinese should concentrate on "socialism and hard work." The paper demanded:

Today we must continue to depend on Mao Tse-tung thought to unite the people, overcome difficulties, and concentrate on working with one heart and mind towards the four modernizations.²¹

This critical reaction by the chief mouthpiece of the PLA against the government policy of de facto de-Maoization and shift from Maoist ideological to a more practical if as yet undetermined economic policy appears to have been taken seriously enough by Teng to modify, at least for the moment, the present line.²² In April 1981, new directives appeared emphasizing the merits of Maoist-style hard work, warning against "worshipping capitalist things" and discouraging contacts with foreigners "who asked too many questions."²³ At the May 1 festivities in Peking there was no official parade, but the portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin were displayed again together with the portrait of Mao Tse-tung. A day earlier, on April 30, Vice Premier Huang Hua had declared that the party had reached

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

22. Teng had to placate the military not only because they still hold the only real power in case of emergency in many regions, but also since military men still fill a considerable number of administrative central and regional economic decision-making posts, though they are often unprepared and ignorant in economic matters.

23. Personal information supplied to the author in Peking, April, 1981.

a consensus on judging the late chairman Mao Tse-tung: "His contributions to China were primary and his mistakes were secondary."²⁴ Huang Hua also maintained that "Mao Tse-tung thought will remain the guiding thought of our party and state."²⁵

This shift in emphasis by the ruling faction of Teng Hsiao-ping was obviously designed to provide a united platform for the party central committee meeting scheduled to be held in June of 1981.²⁶

If Teng has had to compromise his policy line, at least temporarily, to please the military without whose support he could not remain in power, the question remained whether the PLA's proclaimed loyalty to the image of Mao Tse-tung is inherently ideological or whether it is rather based on a concern with maintaining its own privileged position. The renewed stress by the *Liberation Daily* on the four modernizations, for instance, included by implication a reminder not to neglect the modernization of defense, placed on the back burner by the new government policy of cutting down on the overextended modernization plans of the recent past and instead to "readjust, restructure, consolidate, and improve"²⁷ the existing economic plants particularly at the expense of the defense industry and modernization. More important even may be the question whether this critical attitude towards the new line was shared throughout the ranks or whether a division among the military could be discerned that would separate horizontally older from younger officers as indicated by some exhortations to younger officers not to be taken in by capitalist temptations, or even vertically separate different regional commands. On this may depend how far Teng will have to go to maintain the needed unity and for how long he has to follow a line of compromise. For the PLA still remains the only force that could maintain authority in case of unrest and upheavals, and it remains in the wings as the final arbiter of any potential conflict. Yet he makes his peace with the PLA, it appears that eventually Teng will have to return to his new economic policy.

24. *People's Daily*, April 30, 1981.

25. *Ibid.*

26. At the Plenum in June 1981, the verdict on Mao became official. While Mao had rendered "indelible meritorious service in founding and building up our party," he had committed grave "mistakes concerning class struggle in a socialist society," and had caused "most severe setbacks and heaviest losses" to the country and its people. Maoism was out doctrinally as well as practically.

27. This slogan was incorporated in the communique of the Sixth Plenum (of the CPC), June 30, 1981.

E *The System of Checks and Balances*

To facilitate the execution of the new regime's new policy and to counter any possibility of regional defiance, a new system of regional checks and balances has been established in the post-Mao period. Building on the pre-Cultural Revolution past, the provincial authority of the party and the administration has been restructured and redefined, divided, and intermeshed. The revival of the People's Congresses and their standing committees has added a third element of check and balance to this system. The separation of military region and military district command and commissar positions from political power by separate appointments was meant to evade any danger of military usurpation of regional autonomy while preserving the military insurance of central control over the regions. It was a system based on security, leaving little if any leeway for individual initiative at the regional level.

The chart at the end of this paper indicates the complexity of the system and gives the names of the political, military, and administrative personnel as of spring 1981. It shows that in spite of the removal of the commanders of military regions from concurrent political appointments and the division of authority between party secretaries, governors, and chairmen of standing committees of provincial People's Congresses, there are still many dual assignments. Quite a few of the party's provincial first secretaries are simultaneously chairmen of the standing committees of the provincial People's Congresses or even governors of the province. Of particular interest appears to be the fact that several of the military districts' political commissars of the PLA and at least two of the political commissars of the military regions hold simultaneous posts as party secretaries and occasionally as governors or chairmen of the standing committees of the People's Congresses. The PLA, it appears, is still a major factor in the revamped provincial structure. If this list is extended to the great number of second, third, fourth, and other provincial party secretaries and the substantial number of other provincial party officials and to the deputy governors and department heads in the provincial administration, too numerous to list on this chart, the extensive degree of intermeshing of the political and administrative structures and of the PLA's political officers becomes apparent. Of equal interest may be the fact that most of those newly appointed or those maintained in office, possibly with the exception of some posts in Hunan and Shantung provinces, can be regarded as loyal to Teng Hsiao-ping's faction. This is the bureaucratic backbone of Teng and

his group, a strong base, provided the PLA can be kept in line. But the very intricacies of this complicated structure, the immobility and even the corruption of such a self-contained organization could be regarded as a serious impediment in any attempt to provide initiatives to local economic development outside the channels of command which this bureaucracy provides.

F. *The New Economic Policy*

De-Maoization in China, as far as it went, has been an endeavor to escape the disastrous economic consequences of thirty years of Mao's rule, especially of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, recognized in the People's Republic today as unmitigated disasters. The attempt in April and in June of 1981 to salvage some of Mao's doctrinal image by a party "consensus" proclaiming that Mao's merits outweighed his mistakes²⁸ remained at best a vague general assertion, untested in the area of practical political and economic measures.

In fact, after Teng Hsiao-ping had resumed party and government leadership, the Four Modernizations in agriculture, industry, defense, and science represented a 180-degree change of course from Maoist policy to a regular communist program.

The Four Modernizations were at first widely touted as the cure-all that would solve all of China's economic ills and would establish her, by the end of the century as a leading economic and political power. This view, which was shared at the time by many American specialists in and out of government, was soon disproven. Inflation, large budget deficits, unemployment, and an unfavorable balance of trade forced Peking to abandon the exaggerated plans, cancel and abort many of the large projects and foreign contracts, and shift to a policy of "readjustment, restructuring, consolidation, and improvement", meaning, in effect, to work within the existing industrial plant system, by closing down unprofitable ventures and consolidating and improving existing plants.

This shift also ended the policy of regional self-sufficiency, a survival of Maoist ideas. In an article of June 14, 1980, the *Kuangming Daily* criticized the past ten years for disregarding the imbalance of regional potential and demanded that local advantages be brought into fuller play. The *People's Daily* of August 8, 1980, repeated the argument for recognizing regional disparities through a

28. See the communique of the Six Plenum (of the CPC), June 30, 1981.

policy of developing each region's superior features in investment planning. This was to be done, however, not by the region, but by the center. The negative example cited was the great effort made between 1966 and 1978 in reducing coal shipments from north to south by investing large amounts in unprofitable coal production in such southern provinces as Kiangsu at five to six times the production price of Shansi, violating "economic laws." If instead the 700 million *Renminbi* (RMB \$1 = U.S. \$0.60) spent on coal production in Kiangsu had been used one half for investment in light industry in Kiangsu and one half in expanded coal production in Shansi, a profitable exchange, so the argument ran, would have resulted. This argument, then, turning against past Maoist concepts of regional self-sufficiency, favored the role of central planning, as represented by Chen Yun and his associates. In contrast, Hsueh Mu-ch'iao, Teng's leading exponent of reform economics, backed by Chao Tse-yang, Teng's leading administrator, promoted a policy of decentralization by providing greater leeway for provincial and local decision-making, and also by permitting participation of management in local production plans, the so-called "market economy." In the fall of 1980, the argument was joined. At the National People's Congress session in September, Yao I-lin, Teng's finance and planning expert, while recognizing the continuing problems of budget deficits, inflation, and unemployment, maintained that these could be handled under the new policy of economic readjustment and decentralization. In November and December, low-level commentaries on severe difficulties of local enterprises, caused by the unavailability of power, a disorganized transportation system, and dislocated planning put this optimistic view into question. The grain deficit as well as the energy shortage were too serious to be ignored. As a result, a Central Work Conference in December shifted its focus of debate from an intended political resolution (resolving the problem of Hua Kuo-feng's status) to a discussion of the economy and a retreat from the policy of Teng's faction. The outcome was: 1) a new stress on strong central control of the economy; 2) an emphasis on the party's primary political and ideological work with stress on spiritual incentives (Maoist slogans of the "foolish old man removing the mountain," of "fearing neither hardship nor death," reappeared, and the example of the "good soldier Lei Feng" was held up again); 3) a return to trade union work as a matter of labor control; and finally 4) the reemergence of a foreign policy debate. Teng's anti-Soviet policy came under attack and was defended in a fascinating reference to the historical argument between Tso Tsung-tang and Li Hung-chang over Central Asian

versus coastal defense policies, stressing the importance of maintaining China's Central Asian position against the western neighbor.²⁹ The attack against Teng's economic decentralization policy was thus linked with a "debate" on the basic assumptions of China's position between the Soviet and the Western world. This challenge to the whole new line of Teng's policy and the revived emphasis on central planning and spiritual incentives did not, however, end the search for a practical answer to the economic malaise. This answer remained linked to the success or failure of the new economic policy with which the Teng faction was experimenting. This policy was based on economic decentralization and the introduction of a degree of "market economy."

Economic decentralization and regional economic development can be accomplished in two different ways; one is delegation of command and economic decision-making from the center to provincial and local party and administrative authorities; the other is a measure of economic freedom, altogether outside of the command structure of the party through so-called "market economy." The official claim was that present policy was to combine planning with market economy in a joint venture, the details of which appear to have remained somewhat vague.

Such a limited "market economy" was at first experimentally tested in Szechuan Province, then under the administration of Chao Tse-yang who was, partly because of his success, brought to Peking to head the central government, his program having moved with him. A quasi-official formula for this policy was given in *Beijing Review* on November 24, 1980. It read: "Adjustment through the market under the guidance of state planning."³⁰ To reassure those who might be alarmed that through this "market economy" the spectre of "capitalism" might raise its ugly head, the review stated that "as long as the state remains in control of the most important materials and products, things will never get out of hand."³¹

It was clearly this limitation which severely restricted the policy of "market economy." In theory some industrial plant managers in a few selected consumer industries, especially textiles and other light industries, had been given limited freedom of decision-making in producing goods for the market beyond the plan and selling them at

29. See *Kuangming Daily*, February 10, 1981; see also *People's Daily*, January 8, 1981, implying a stronger policy towards Taiwan.

30. See *Beijing Review*, no. 47 (Nov. 24, 1980), p. 25.

31. *Ibid.*

profit, a profit of which they, according to one claim, were permitted to retain 20 percent (according to other information, only 9.5 percent) for use as bonuses or investment for expansion. To accomplish this they had their representatives explore the market and obtain special loans from government banks at reasonable interest rates, given on the basis of the expected profitability of the venture. In other words, in contrast to allotted government funds, given without regard for profit, the managers were in this case accountable for profitable use of the loan. For this purpose the managers were supposedly able to obtain raw materials from the market, set prices, and, theoretically, hire and fire workers, decide on designs and quantity and quality according to demand and taste of the clientele; in other words, produce on the basis of demand and profitability. This additional production for market demand was, however, permissible only after fulfillment of the production plan, and was thus to be over and beyond the regular plan, which remained in force.

This experiment was presumably successfully tested in Szechuan in October 1978 where six enterprises were selected for the new policy. In 1979, the experiment was extended to 84 enterprises and was claimed by Chinese communist economists to have increased production in that same year by 16.17 percent and profits by 23.3 percent. Of the additional production the state was to receive 64 percent. The rest was used by the enterprise for investment and allegedly to "double salaries" according to a policy of "more to the nation, more to enterprises, and more to staff and workers."³²

In 1980 this policy was claimed to have been applied nationwide to 6600 enterprises out of a total of over 300,000 enterprises. Though only a small percentage of the total, the selected enterprises were larger ones and accounted for a higher percentage of production in their branches than their number might indicate. All of them were in the field of textile or other light consumer industries. In Chekiang, for instance, 26 percent of the textile mills and other consumer industries were claimed to have been included in this experiment of partly increasing production for a "market economy," a figure which was expected to increase to 30 percent in 1981. The actual increase of production for "market economy" was, however, believed to be considerably less than the claims advanced for Szechuan and was

32. See article by Liu Kuoguang, "On Reforming China's Economic Management System," in *China's Economy in the 1980's*, Hong Kong: Economic Information and Agence, June 1980.

estimated by some observers as being more in the vicinity of 5–10 percent of the total production of these 6600 enterprises.

More important than the question of percentage increase was, however, the reality of the claim of the independence of a segment of "market economy" from the control of party planners. In fact, the freedom of action of the plant managers of these specially selected consumer industries was much more circumscribed in practice than theory proclaimed. For one, though in theory the managers need not be party members, in practice it appears that all those on whom there has been such information were indeed party members and were therefore under party discipline at the central, provincial, and local level. By training and experience they were party bureaucrats without education in engineering, business administration, or any other relevant work. All their industrial management experience had been in the application of orders and directives of the planning system. They also could not be easily replaced by trained engineers or other qualified personnel because of the catastrophic decline of the educational system under Mao's policies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. It will at best take much time to train a new generation of qualified personnel to handle any such new "market economy." In the meantime party policy would be the only standard to be applied by the managers, all the more so since they had to have approval for all decisions not only by the party organs at the provincial and local levels but also by the party secretary in the plant itself in charge of a workers' council who had to be consulted on all matters.

Even aside from this personal limitation and the ever-present party discipline, the freedom of action of the manager was in practice severely restrained. The concept of the enterprise as "a relatively independent commodity producer" which "under the unified planned guidance of the state . . . manages its own personnel, finance, materials, production supply and marketing . . . a genuinely independent economic accounting unit, responsible for its own profits and losses" as the Chinese communist author³³ prescribes it, has no basis in reality. It will be next to impossible for even the most resourceful manager to obtain substantial quantities of material outside the plan; there is little leeway for him in the controlled price mechanism, and though he may in theory fire undisciplined and incapable workers, in practice he has no such choice because of the prevailing

33. *Ibid.*

unemployment. The one thing that the system guarantees is employment, the "iron rice bowl" in Chinese communist parlance.

In the annual or biannual meetings that had been instituted in some provinces under the provincial commerce and industry departments to set quantity, quality, and design for (textile) products, the departments as well as the factory managements and shop assistants were represented so that plans were jointly formulated, with the decision, however, retained by the provincial departments and the central ministries.

As a further intended improvement, specialized companies were set up in different industries under the aegis of the party central committee, eleven nation-wide by the ministries and twenty four on a regional basis, to "readjust the division of work according to products." Such "companies" coordinated existing factories for joint planning, diversification, and distribution, especially in Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, and Liaoning, i.e., the most advanced industrial centers. These were, however, not independent economic planning or accounting units, but rather a new type of refinement within the planning order.

The "marketing" segment of consumer industries was thus very circumscribed and included as of spring 1981 at best a very small section of the overall production, not enough to affect it significantly. One of the reasons for this limitation appears to be the concern that greater leeway would endanger the system itself. As a Chinese communist author stated: "In the light of the experience of certain socialist countries, to give more power of self-management to the enterprise and let the market play a greater role in regulating economy would be liable to lead to a series of problems such as blindness in production and construction, price fluctuations, one-sided inclination for profit-seeking, and a wide disparity in incomes," a danger "which can and should be prevented" in the Chinese reform plans.³⁴ The communists obviously face a dilemma. Since their system cannot tolerate a true market economy, all their efforts in this direction will remain of necessity stunted.

The problem, however, goes deeper. A key issue appears to be that of resource distribution among the advanced and backward regions of China. The policy of attempting to equalize development by syphoning off the revenue from the main surplus regions for investment in the backward provinces and regions continues. To lift

34. *Ibid.*

the whole country simultaneously out of its economic stagnation seems to be entirely impractical. If any breakthrough towards real economic advancement is to be accomplished, it would appear to depend on giving those regions with the greatest potential a free reign to use their resources for their own development. In time their success might affect the rest of the country. These urban regions would then also be in a better position to absorb the constant stream of migration from an impoverished countryside which poses one of the most difficult demographic problems faced by Peking today.

Such a policy would necessitate a restriction of central control in most of the industrial sector. It would also imply economic elbow room for a professional industrial management group that has still to be created. Most of all it would have to be a regional development.

As of now there was no indication that Peking would allow such differences in economic development. On the contrary, in permitting additional profits "attention must be paid to the effects on the neighboring areas; discrepancies of undue extent must not be allowed."³⁵ The argument runs that such differences may not be the result of the enterprise's own efforts but of "objective advantages" such as "natural surroundings, differences in prices, more imported technology and equipment from abroad," and for this reason "the state must deal with this problem without bias" by not distributing "huge benefits easily obtained by natural advantages" to the respective producers.³⁶ In fact "the state must retain a certain portion of the total investment instead of putting all the investment funds at the disposal of the banks and enterprises" and "the proportion kept by the state is to be distributed to various sectors concerned in order to adjust the proportional relations."³⁷

What is at stake here is in essence the communist order of a centrally planned and controlled economy. No region and no major urban center can be permitted to develop on its own and become a danger to the centralized communist economic system. A limited delegation of command is as far as this reform program was willing to go to date. And even that part had become a matter of argument among contending factions in Peking.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*

G. *The Crisis of Confidence*

This problem of the need and of the danger of economic regional latitude and enterprise autonomy must be seen in the light of a larger challenge to the communist order in the People's Republic, the challenge called by the communists "the crisis of confidence." With the collapse of the cult of Mao and the grim denouement of the disaster caused by the fanatical belief in Mao's pronouncements and policies, it appears only natural that many of those duped have finally lost all faith in that Marxist doctrine from which Mao derived his ideological authority and utopian fantasies. To separate those from an alleged "scientific" Marxism is all the more difficult since the magic formula "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought" is for political reasons being maintained. It is obviously no easy task for Peking's ideologists to draw the line between the two; but that is now being attempted. To counter the challenge to the doctrine and the loss of faith resulting from the failure of Mao's policies and the economic malaise, numerous articles in 1980 and 1981 strove to defend Marxism-Leninism by stressing the difference between "fanatical" Marxism (the gang of four) and "scientific" Marxism and between "false faith" (the Mao cult) and "real faith" in the doctrine.

The problem is stated in the following terms:

Some people think Marxism-Leninism no longer works. Therefore they are unwilling to study it any longer. In school political lessons are not well received. Organs and factories often hold political and theoretical study classes in a happy-go-lucky fashion. To them, they are just occasions for killing time. Some people have become doubtful about Marxism-Leninism. They neither believe in it nor study it. This is the so-called confidence crisis.³⁸

The argument then runs that the "collapse of confidence" was caused by Lin Piao and the gang of four who are accused of changing "the revolutionary theory from a science into theology." The "rites" before Mao's pictures, the "religious atmosphere," the "mad passion" for studying Mao's works, the "chanting of quotations" were causing "blind faith" that has now collapsed — a plausible argument indeed. The more difficult part for the pamphleteer was to argue that

38. See the article by Guo Luiji, "Commenting on the So-Called 'Confidence Crisis,'" *Wen Hui Bao*, Hong Kong, January 13, 1980.

Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought was still valid because it was a "science" which must be studied. The predication is the old doctrinal assertion that Marxism is the "revolutionary doctrine of the proletariat emancipating itself and all mankind," derived from "the laws of the objective world." There has to be a distinction between "genuine and sham Marxism-Leninism," there has to be "faith, but not blind faith."³⁹ True, "certain Marxist-Leninist conclusions have become hackneyed and out of date," but that means only that the theory must be developed. The interesting aspect of this very defensive argument is that when speaking of the alleged science of the doctrine, it is only Marxism-Leninism, and Mao's Thought is attached later when he is quoted as claiming that Marxism "fears no criticism."⁴⁰

Other articles, reacting to the same perceived danger as also expressed in student comments and letters to the papers, follow the same argument of distinguishing between alleged sham and genuine Marxism and the assertion that things have changed for the better with the new "criterion for truth," "the price rise of farm produce," the new foreign policy and other presumed advances, and a plea for time, all having little to do with the crisis of the doctrine.⁴¹ Some, asserting that democracy "belongs to a class," are distinguishing between "socialist democracy" and that "bourgeois democracy" which is singled out as a target for attack and as a dangerous instrument of vilifying the dictatorship of the proletariat for violating human rights."⁴² Basically the arguments repeat the old shibboleths, such as that of the "advanced, middle, and backward level" with the assurance that the vast majority of the young is advanced and good, receptive to reform; and it is "only a handful of young people" who "pursue the rotten lifestyle of the bourgeoisie." "Red and expert" is the goal again, but "persuasion" is to be the best method.

One may wonder whether the old slogans and assurances are sufficient to deal with a genuine intellectual crisis. The dilemma of Marxism, to reconcile doctrine and reality, has become more serious in the wake of the bankruptcy of Maoist rule. If there is doubt in the minds of the communist leadership about the attitude of the young and the disillusionment in communist doctrine among a large section of the population which was perhaps always more passively resigned than ever taken in, the most serious concern must relate to the

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*

attitude, the mood, and the morale of the military on whom in the last resort the communist power has to rest. That there was such a concern can be inferred from the editorials, commentaries, and statements by leading commanders that appeared in the army newspaper and other national papers from the fall of 1979 to the spring of 1981. The tenor differed somewhat from the appeals to the youth and the general population. There was still the leftist influence of Lin Piao to be taken care of, or what was called the need to liberate thinking "from an ossified or semi-ossified state." On the other hand "some comrades, mainly young comrades" have apparently not understood the limits of "ideological emancipation." To "peddle the declining, decadent ideology . . . of the contemporary Western world" or the "sham democracy and the so-called 'human rights' of the bourgeoisie" would mean "a great ideological retreat."⁴³ The young comrades, many of whom joined the party during the Cultural Revolution and were promoted during that time are lacking "the basic party knowledge and have to be educated about the "sham socialism" of Lin Piao and the gang of four, but also about the non-proletarian ideal of the capitalist and feudal classes.

If there is such a ferment, and if the democracy wall has been abolished, if the forced migration to the countryside is upheld, and if, most of all, the expected improvements are lagging, then the latest discontent may bring greater pressures on the rulers and may show itself first in this or that region where conditions are most serious. Any study of regionalism must therefore deal not only with the political game and struggle of factions and the grim issues of economic realities, but also with the most fundamental problems of beliefs and values and their effect on the policy and the system.

The one hundred eighty-degree turn away from Maoism may only be the beginning. The restoration of and new emphasis on private plots in agriculture, the expansion of free markets, most of all the new policy of the envisaged autonomy of light consumer goods industries and movement towards a market economy, may have some unforeseen consequences. It appears to the non-doctrinal observer that any expansion of a true market economy will have to favor those urban regions that undoubtedly have the only true potential for modernization. The key question may well be whether the ideological arguments, listed above, may become linked to these regional issues, as a result of either rising expectations or of disappointment of the present hopes.

43. *Ibid.*

REGIONAL ORGANIZATION I

	Communist Party 1st Secretary	Administration Governor or Chairman	People's Congress Chm. Standing Com.	Military District, Com- mander & Pol. Com.	Military Region, Com- mander and Pol. Com.
Peking	T'uan Chun-i 2d Secretary: *Chiao Lo-yu	*Chiao Lo-yu (Acting)	Chia Ting-san	Fu Ch'ung-pi Garrison Wu Lieh Garrison	Ch'in Chi-wei ?
Tientsin	Chen Wei-ta	Hu Ch'i-wei	?	Tsao Hsi-k'ang Garrison Hsieh Hsueh-kung Garrison	<u>Peking Military Region</u>
Hopei	Chin Ming	*Li-Erh-chung	*Li Erh-chung	Ma Hui	
Shansi	Huo Shih-lien	Lo Kuei-po	Juan Po-sheng	Wang Fu-chih	
Nei Mong.	Chou Hui	Kung Fei	T'ing Mao	T'eng Chun-ch'ing	
Shanghai	Chen Kuo-tung	Wang Tao-nan	Jan Yu-min	Ho I-hsiang Garrison Li Pao-chi Garrison	Nieh Feng-chih Kuo Lin-hsiang
Anhui	*Chang Ching-fu Dep. Gov. Ku C.H.	Chou Tzu-chien	*Ku Cho-hsin	Yu Kuang-mao	<u>Nanking Military Region</u>
Kiangsu	*Hsu Chia-t'un	Hui Yu-yu	*Hsu Chia-t'un	Huang Ch'ao-t'ien *Hsu Chia-t'un	
Chekiang	*T'ieh Ying	Li Feng-p'ing	*T'ieh Ying	Kuan Chun-t'ung *T'ieh Ying	
Kwangtung	Ten Chung-i	Liang Ling-kuang	Li Chien-chen	Chang Ching-yao Hsiung Fei	<u>Canton Military Region</u>
Kwangsi	*Ch'iao Hsiao-kuang	Ch'in Ying-chi	Huang Jung	Chao Hsin-jan *Ch'iao Hsiao-kuang	
Hunan	Mao Chih-yong	Sun Kuo-chih	Wan Ta	T'ung Kuo-kuei *Mao Chih-yung	
Hainan	?	?	?	Chiang Hsueh-shan Feng Ching-ch'iao	
Heilung- kiang	Yang Yi-chen	Chen Lei	Chao Teh-hsun	Chao Hsien-shun Chao Hsing-yuan	Li Teh-sheng Liao Han-sheng
Liaoning	Kuo Feng	Chen P'u-ju	Huang Ou-tung	Yang Ta-i	<u>Shenyang Military Region</u>
Kirin	*Wang En-mao	Yu K'o	Li Yu-wen	Ho Yu-fa *Wang En-mao	
Honan	Liu Chieh	Liu Chieh		Shang Kan	<u>Wuhan Military Region</u>
Hupei	*Chen P.H. *Indicates dual appointments.	Nan Ning-fu	*Chen P'i-hsien	Chao Hsin-ch'u Chang Hsin-lung	

Source: These two charts are derived from FBIS Analysis Report, March 6, 1980, and China Aktuell, Official Activities, brought up to date by personal information.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATION II

	Communist Party 1st Secretary	Administration Governor or Chairman	People's Congress Chm. Standing Com.	Military District, Com- mander & Pol. Com.	Military Region, Com- mander and Pol. Com.
Fukien	Liao Chi-kao	Ma Hsing-yuan	Liao Chi-kao	Tung Teh-szu	Yang Cheng-wu
Kiangsi	*Chiang W. C.	Pai Tung-tsai	Yang Shang-kuei	Chiang Chun-kuan Hsin Chun-chieh Chang Chih-yung	*Chiang Wei-ching <u>Fuchow Military Region</u>
Szechuan	Tao Chi-lung	Lu Ta-tung	Tu Hsin-yuan	Chao Wen-chin	Yu T'ai-ch'ung
Tibet	*Yin Fa-t'ang	T'ien Pao	Ngapei Ngawang Jigma	Lu Chia-han Hsi Chin-wu *Yin Fa-t'ang	<u>Chenstu Military Region</u>
Yunnan	*An P'ing-sheng	Liu Ming-hui	*An P'ing-sheng	Chang Hao-t'ang	Ch'ang Ch'i-hsiu
Kweichow	?	Su Kang	Hsu Chien-sheng	*An P'ing-sheng Chang Chung ?	Liu Ch'i-chien <u>Kunming Military Region</u>
Kansu	*Sung P'ing	Feng Chi-hsin	Wang Shih-t'ai	Li Ching	Tu Yi-teh
Shensi	Ma Wen-jui	Lo Kuai-po	Chuan Po-sheng	*Sung P'ing Hu Ping-yun	Hsiao Hua
Ningxia	Li Hsueh-chi	Ma Hsin	Ma Ch'ing-nieh	Huang Ching-yao	<u>Lanchow Military Region</u>
Chinghai	Liang Pu-t'ing	Chang Kuo-sheng	?	Huo Shih-lien Wu Sheng-chung	
Sinkiang	Wang Feng	Simayi Aimaiti	Tiemuer Dawamaiti	Huang Yu-hsia S. Sinkiang P.C.	*Wang Feng Hsiao Ch'uan-fu <u>Urumchi Military Region</u>
Shantung	*Pai Lu-ping	*Su I-jan	Chao Lin	Chao Feng *Su I-jan	Jao Shou-k'un Hsiao Wang-tung <u>Tainan Military Region</u>

*Indicates dual appointments.

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